Somaliland Status Policy Review

Proceed Carefully, Consult Widely, Consider Facts

The author in downtown Mogadishu at the monument to Somalia’s national hero Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan who resisted the British, Italian, and Ethiopian empires.

The Horn of Africa is particularly tense and conflicted at this time. Wars and severe internal and interstate tensions wrack the region. At this precarious moment, there is rising advocacy in U.S. Africa policy circles for recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. All members of the United Nations formally recognize Somalia’s borders at the time of its acceptance into that organization in 1960, which followed the voluntary unification of the former British Somaliland with the former Italian Somaliland into the state of Somalia. United States interests and the best interests of the people of the Horn of Africa region require that a United States policy review of Somaliland’s status be conducted with great care, thorough consultation, and respect for relevant facts. This review should consider maintenance of the status quo, joining other nations in establishing a diplomatic liaison office in Hargeisa, and extending formal recognition of Somaliland independence.

I first visited Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, in 2001. As political counselor at our embassy in Nairobi 2006-2008, I had responsibility for implementing our policy for all of historic Somalia and then played a role in setting up our Nairobi-based proto embassy (“Somalia Affairs Unit”). As Ambassador to Djibouti 2018-2021, I observed Somalia and supported our Ambassador in Mogadishu and our Somalia-focused military both in Djibouti and Somalia. I attended as an observer the 2020 talks in Djibouti between delegations representing the Somaliland administration and the Federal Government of Somalia. As Ambassador to Somalia 2022-2023, I visited Hargeisa and Berbera, meeting with Somaliland’s senior leadership. My team members followed up that meeting with additional trips to Somaliland, as did our military colleagues based in Djibouti. I also met prominent Somalilanders based in Mogadishu. I listened to those advocating Somaliland independence and those advocating Somaliland’s re-incorporation into the Federal Republic of Somalia as a federal member state with full autonomy.

Proceed Carefully

Americans will not suffer directly from any further destabilization of the Horn of Africa caused by unilateral and uncoordinated measures. Rather, the people of this long-suffering region will suffer even more. United States interests are best served by the Horn of Africa countries achieving stability, security, and prosperity internally and regionally. Ethnic Somalis, and their complex, often contentious, clan divisions, play key roles in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia, as well as Somalia itself. Traditional Somali clan territories cross international borders. For many Somalis, clan identity is much stronger than national identity. Moves that upset clan balance can trigger violent reactions by clan militias not under the control of any government. The region has experienced both positive developments and negative setbacks over the past few years. I want to see more of the former and less of the latter. In diplomacy, as in medicine, the first rule is “do no harm.”

Consult the Region and International Partners

Currently Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Burundi contribute troops to the African Union’s military mission in support of Somalia’s war against the al-Shabaab terror organization. (Burundi is scheduled to be replaced by Egypt.) These countries have experience and deep knowledge about historic Somalia. Djibouti borders Somaliland and maintains close relations with authorities in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. The Chair of the African Union Commission, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, is a highly knowledgeable and supremely capable diplomat I respect deeply from our collaborations when he was Foreign Minister in Djibouti. His Chief of Staff, Ambassador Mohamed El-Amine Souef, until recently led the African Union Mission in Somalia. He is also a top-level diplomat well-versed in this complex region.

Turkey is a major international partner of Somalia in security, infrastructure, and development, maintaining diplomatic offices in both Mogadishu and Hargeisa. United Nations member states currently having diplomatic representation in Hargeisa are United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Denmark, Kenya, Turkey, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. None of these countries recognize Somaliland’s self-declared independence. The European Union staffs an active maritime security program in Somaliland. Taiwan, not a United Nations member state, has an active representation office in Hargeisa. Our policy review would benefit from consultations with these key international partners, in addition to leadership in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Prominent Somalilanders in Mogadishu should also be consulted, such as the Deputy Prime Minister, traditional clan leaders, and business executives.

Consider Relevant Facts

Much of the rhetoric concerning Somaliland status is dishonest. Those making arguments on either side of the question often purposely make false statements and edit out facts that counter their view. Here are some facts I consider relevant to our policy review.

· The Isaaq clan accounts for roughly 2/3s of Somaliland’s population. Somaliland independence is overwhelmingly supported by the Isaaq, who dominate the administration and security forces.

· The remaining 1/3 of the population are mostly divided among the non-Isaaq Dir subclans and the Darod clan, each with their traditional territories. Their views on Somaliland status are more varied with many supporting an autonomous state within Somalia where Dir and Darod communities also exist. Hargeisa has dispatched the Somaliland military to attack pro-reunion communities within Somaliland, with Las Anod the best-known instance. In the last election, Somaliland’s electoral commission declined to set up voting stations in some pro-reunion areas.

· The Federal Government of Somalia recognizes a new Northeastern state made up of pro-unionist (non-Isaaq) communities bordering Puntland. The territory of this new state is within the borders of the former colony of British Somaliland, hence are claimed by the Somaliland administration.

· It is illegal in Somaliland to express support for any status other than independence. I heard the Hargeisa delegation during the Djibouti talks defend this law. Somaliland President Bihi once told me, when I asked about Somalilanders who support reunion, “of course we arrest and imprison our traitors.” Prominent Somalilanders active in Mogadishu politics and business cannot return home to visit their families. In Mogadishu, advocates of Somaliland independence are free to express themselves.

· The Isaaq community was singled out by the dictator Siad Barre for indiscriminate mass slaughter. While all communities suffered during the brutal civil war, the Isaaq suffered the most from Barre’s murderous campaigns of annihilation.

· The 2012 Somalia provisional constitution replaced the unitary state with a federal structure. That structure is purposely defined vaguely. The intent was for Somaliland and regions under al-Shabaab control to be represented in final negotiations over central government/federal member state government roles and responsibilities. That has not happened. Somalia federal government Presidents have tended to be pro-federalism as candidates and pro-centralization once in office. Relations between the center and the states are mostly politicized, arbitrary, and dysfunctional.

· Some Somaliland detractors claim the administration made a deal with al-Shabaab to exempt Somaliland from their depredations in return for granting safe refuge for the families of al-Shabaab leadership. I never saw evidence proving that allegation.

· Somaliland leaders point out their superior level of security, administration, and economic development relative to the rest of Somalia. This is true. Somaliland benefits from the efforts of Somalia forces and their international security partners in containing al-Shabaab to the southern part of the country far from Somaliland’s borders.

· Somalia’s Puntland state, bordering Somaliland and once a center of piracy, has also achieved significant success in security, administration, and economic development relative to the rest of the country. Puntland jealously protects its autonomy while remaining a Somalia state.

· The prospects for international recognition of Somaliland’s claim to independence tend to rise and fall with the state building process and security situation in the rest of Somalia. Currently, Somalia is suffering from worsening central government/state government relations and major setbacks in the war to liberate Somalis who suffer under the murderous rule of the al-Shabaab terror organization. Hence calls for Somaliland independence are on the rise.

· East Africa has experienced secessionist movements that achieved international recognition in Ethiopia (Eritrea) and Sudan (South Sudan). In both cases, international recognition followed settlements first with the origin country and then with the African Union/Organization of African Unity. This is the precedent.

Conclusion: Somaliland Status Determination Requires a Deliberative Process

Somaliland status merits open discussion within Somaliland, within Somalia as a whole, and within the region. All are stakeholders. For the United States as a foreign friend to historic Somalia, including Somaliland, there are three options:

· Maintain the status quo with no change in status and no negotiations or discussions among the interested parties. We retain our embassy in Mogadishu with no diplomatic presence elsewhere in historic Somalia.

· Establish a diplomatic office in Hargeisa, possibly with coverage for neighboring Puntland as well. This office would function as a part of the United States Mission to Somalia under the authority of the United States Ambassador to Somalia. We could employ our diplomatic presence in Hargeisa and Mogadishu to urge both administrations to renew Somaliland status negotiations, encouraging other international partners to join us. A tentative agreement was reached in the 2020 Djibouti talks between Hargeisa and Mogadishu to initiate confidence-building, win/win cooperation in specific areas. The Somalia President at the time then reneged on that agreement. Let’s try again.

· Grant unilateral and uncoordinated recognition of Somaliland’s independence claim. This initiative would harm our relations with Somalilanders who support reunion with autonomy, with historic Somalia as a whole, with the Horn of Africa region and with the African Union. Such a move would also destabilize Somali clan relations throughout the region. Alienation of the people and government of historic Somalia is likely to increase the influence of rival powers.

I favor the middle course of action. I also favor encouraging our friends in the region to consider creative solutions modeled elsewhere in the world. The United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Tanzania (as regards Zanzibar), and Canada (as regards Quebec) all use a variable geometry version of federalism/devolution such that different regions have different roles and responsibilities in relation to the central government. In the United States, we have “one size fits all” for the 50 states and different arrangements for Puerto Rico and other territories. Historic Somalia’s national revival requires settlement of governance issues, especially Somaliland status, and liberation of the entire national territory from terror group occupation. These are difficult but achievable goals. I wish the Somali people success.